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THE SILENCE OF CONGRESS
DOUGLAS HILTON CARLISLE*
Volumes are filled with the numerous debates, examinations, and
discussions of the powers of the American Congress, and legion is
the number of articles and works on the relation of the states to
the federal government. But generally these are in regard to the
actions of Congress, delving into what Congress can do or what
it is forbidden to do. There are some powers delegated to Con-
gress by the Constitution which have not yet been exercised; in
such instances only the judiciary has been able to say what the pow-
ers of Congress are, and perhaps only the judiciary can determine
what Congress means when it is silent on a subject. When the
States, in absence of Congressional action, have dared to legislate,
the court has usually been obliged to determine whether the silence
of Congress means that no action, either by the State or by the
federal government, shall be taken in that area or whether the ac-
tion of the State is legal and to be enforced by the Courts. Scholars
have generally overlooked the question of the powers of the states
on matters where Congress has not passed legislation.
This question was first brought to the attention of scholars and
legal thinkers by Mr. Henry W. Bickle of the University of Penn-
sylvania in 1927.1 In the case of Oregon-Washington Railroad
Co. v,. State of Washington,2 it was stated that there are two fields
in the relation of the states to the regulation of interstate commerce
by Congress: one in which the states cannot regulate at all, even
in the silence of Congress, and the other in which the states may
regulate under their police power until Congress by affirmative ac-
tion occupies the field and therefore excludes state action. Mr. Bickle
points out that this principle stated and reiterated in subsequent
cases, seems to divide the possible subject of regulation into two
classes: those national in character, requiring uniform regulation
which is exclusively the power of Congress, and those local in charac-
ter which come into the power of the states concurrently with
Congress. He also says that the silence of Congress may mean
OProfessor of Political Science, University of South Carolina. A.B., Mississippi; M.A.,
Universty of North Carolina; Completed residence at University of North Carolina for
Ph.D. Vrittel for four journals of legal and political studies including the Journal of
Internatbnal Law and the Journal of Politics.
1. 41 HARv. L. Rnv. 200 (1927).
2. 270 U. S. 87, 46 Sup. Ct. 279, 70 L. Ed. 482 (1925).
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either: (1) that Congress considers the matter so diverse in nature
that the states can handle the matter best, or (2) that Congress
does not care to have any legislation on the subject. Mr. Bickle's
article contains seven principles which are summarized as follows:
(1) The power of Congress to regulate commerce among the states
is granted exclusively to Congress so far as it involves matters of
national concern, (2) but the Constitution does not take from it
the police powers of the state. (3) Silence of Congress on some
matters is interpreted by the Supreme Court as evidence of its will
that the matter not be regulated by the states, (4) but Congress
may break this silence and permit state police laws to operate where
they involve interstate commerce as a matter of national concern.
(5) In matters of local concern the powers of Congress are not ex-
clusive, and (6) as to such matters its silence discloses no objection
to the operation of state laws. (7) When Congress acts affirma-
tively in any situation involving interstate commerce a state statute
will become inoperative which: (a.) either conflicts with some posi-
tive regulation of the federal legislation or (b.) is regarded by the
Court as intruding into the field which Congress meant to occupy
by its legislation.
Since the time when these principles were formulated, many prob-
lems which were formerly wrested with by the states have become
matters of national concern. On these the silence of Congress has
been broken. But there are several cases which show that these
principles are still valid for matters which have not yet received
Congressional action. Occasionally, however, two of these principles
may prove contradictory in application; for some matters which
have become national in importance still retain a sufficiently local
character to warrant continued control by the states.3
Problems confined to particular states are usually solved by local
legislation, and premature action by Congress on such problems
would cause confusion and dissatisfaction, even if Congress were
acting within its power. It is not unusual that Congress has pro-
fited by the experience of the states which have dealt with a matter
before it attracted national attention.
The purpose of this paper is to examine recent cases for the
practical application of the basic principles which we have noted.
Our investigation will incidentally disclose subsidiary principles and,
it is hoped, will result in a concrete up-to-date view of the legal
possibilities inherent in the silence of Congress.
3. South Carolina State Highway Commission v. Barnwell Brothers, 303
U. S. 177, 58 Sup. Ct. 510, 82 L. Ed. 734 (1967).
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The exclusive power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce
has been generally accepted since the time of Gibbons v. Ogden.
4
More recently the Supreme Court has upheld the power of Con-
gress to prohibit from interstate commerce kidnapped persons, 5
women for immoral purposes, 6 and goods made by convict labor.
7
This power was broadly defined in sustaining the power of Congress
to prohibit the taking of stolen automobiles into interstate commerce
when it said:
Congress can certainly regulate interstate commerce to the ex-
tent of forbidding and punishing the use of such commerce as
an agency to promote immorality, dishonesty or the spread of
any evil or harm to the people of other states from the state of
origin ... In doing this it is merely exercising the police power,
for the benefit of the public, within the field of interstate com-
merce.8
And the prohibition may be designed to give effect to the policies
of Congress in relation to the instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce, as in the case of commodities owned by interstate carriers.
9
At the present time there is, then, no doubt that Congress has ex-
clusive jurisdiction to regulate interstate commerce.'
These cases are in regard to the power of Congress. to make pro-
hibitions; the power of Congress to regulate is more clearly seen
for our purpose in U. S. v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n.10
Here it was claimed that insurance was not interstate commerce
and so not subject to regulation, in this case not subject to the pro-
visions of the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court held that since
a substantial part of its business was in interstate commerce the
company was engaged in interstate commerce and subject to regula-
tion. Speaking for the Court Justice Black said:
In all cases in which the court has relied upon the proposition
that "the business of insurance is not commerce" its attention
4. 22 U. S. 1, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824).
5. United States v. Wheeler, 254 U. S. 281, 41 Sup. Ct. 133, 65 L. Ed. 270
(1920).
6. Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 33 Sup. Ct. 281, 57 L. Ed. 523.
(1913) ; Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 37 Sup. Ct. 192, 61 L. Ed.
442 (1917).
7. Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Ill. Central Railway Co., 299 U. S. 334,
57 Sup. Ct. 19, 81 L. Ed. 386 (1936).
8. Brooks v. United States, 267 U. S. 432, 436, 45 Sup. Ct. 345, 69 L. Ed. 699
(1925).
9. United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, 29 Sup. Ct. 527,
53 L. Ed. 836 (1909).
10. 322 U. S. 533, 64 Sup. Ct. 1162, 88 L. Ed. 1440 (1945).
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was focused on the validity of state statutes -the extent to
which the Commerce Clause automatically deprived states of
the power to regulate the insurance business. Since Congress
had at no time attempted to control the insurance business, in-
validation of state statutes would practically have been equiva-
lent to granting insurance companies engaged in interstate trade
a blanket license to operate without legal restraint.11
With this statement it is clear that in the absence of action by Con-
gress the states are allowed to act in some instances, but it should
be noticed that the absence of regulation by Congress did not sur-
render the right to legislate in that field.
However, this is not to be interpreted as meaning that the Con-
stitution takes away the police powers of the state although under
such powers a state may accomplish a purpose which to all effects
regulates interstate commerce. In Southern Pacific Railroad Co. v.
Arizona12 the Court said:
Congress, in enacting legislation within its constitutional authori-
ty, will not be deemed to have intended to strike down a state
statute designed to protect the health and safety of the public
unless its purposes to do so is clearly manifested.
Also in South Carolina State Highway Commission v. Barnwell
Bros.'3 the question arose as to whether a state could regulate the
carrying capacity, size, and- number of wheels on motor trucks using
the state highways. The Court sustained the regulatory power of
the state. Chief justice Stone in speaking for the Court said:
While constitutional grant to Congress of power to regulate
interstate commerce has been held to operate of its own force
to curtail state power in some measure, it did not forestall all
state action affecting inter-state commerce. Ever since Wilson
v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245, and Cooley v. Board
of Port Wardens, 12 How. 299, it has been recognized that
these are matters of local concern, the regulation of which una-
voidably involves some regulation of interstate commerce but
which, because of their local character and their number and di-
versity may never be fully dealt with by Congress. Notwithstand-
ing the commerce clause, such regulation in the absence of Con-
gressional action has for the most part been left to the states
by the decisions of this Court, subject to the other applicable
restraints.
11. 322 U. S. 534, 544.
12. 325 U. S. 761, 65 Sup. Ct. 1515, 89 L. Ed. 1915 (1945).
13. 303 U. S. 177, 58 Sup. Ct. 510, 82 L. Ed. 734 (1937).
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The commerce clause, by its own force, prohibits discrimina-
tion against interstate commerce, whatever its form or method,
and the decisions of this Court have recognized that there is
scope for its like operation when state legislation nominally of
local concern is in point of fact aimed at interstate commerce...
But the present case affords no occasion for saying that the
bare possession of power by Congress to regulate the interstate
traffic forces the state to conform to standards which Congress
might, but has not adopted, or curtails their power to take
measures to insure safety and conservation of their highways
which may be applied to like traffic moving intrastate.
Here the silence of Congress was clearly interpreted as meaning
that the state had under its police power the right to regulate such
vehicles on its highways in order to insure the proper use of the
roads and to protect the safety of its citizens.
But on the other hand silence of Congress is interpreted as mean-
ing that it is the will of Congress that the matter not be regulated
by the states. The case of Baldwin, Commissioner of Agriculture
& Markets v. Seelig, Inc.1 4 is ample illustration. In this case New
York had prohibited the sale of milk imported from other states
unless the price paid the out of state producer was up to the minimum
allowed in New York. Although it was carefully shown that Con-
gress had not acted on such a subject, the Court did not sustain the
law, on the ground that while the economic security of the dairy-
men may have been the basis for affording the community a sure
and sanitary supply of milk, a vital product, "this is in any sense
a restriction on interstate commerce". Rather than to leave the pos-
sibility of the conclusion that the Court follows no principle in dis-
tinguishing between this case and the South Carolina State High-
way Commission case one should remember that in the latter in-
stance all the companies were regulated equally xegardless of whether
they were engaging in interstate or intrastate commerce. Moreover,
in the case of the milk law of New York the business in that state
was given an advantage over the business in other states. The ten-
dency of the Court seems to be to dislike such a law if it is allowed
to work for the benefit of the domestic business.
There have been times when Congress has broken this silence and
permitted the police laws of a state to operate where they involve
interstate commerce as a matter of national concern. This has
been sustained since is was clearly the intention of Congress to al-
14. 294 U. S. 511, 55 Sup. Ct. 120, 79 L. Ed. 1032 (1935).
5
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low the state to supplement the Act of Congress in order to regulate
conditions peculiar to its own circumstances. Although there are
other cases on this point, 15 this principle arose clearly in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington.16 The state of Washington passed a law
establishing a state unemployment fund, part made up from the
employer, part taken from the wages of the individual, and the re-
mainder made up by the state. The shoe company claimed that the
company and employee were engaged in interstate commerce and
therefore was not subject to the tax since Congress had passed legisla-
tion on the subject. The law of Congress was such a social welfare act
as the one passed by the Washington legislature, but 53 STAT., 1391,
26 U.S.C. § 1606 (a) provided that "no person required under a
state law to make payments to an unemployment fund shall be re-
lieved from compliance therewith on the ground that he is engaged in
interstate or foreign commerce". The Court, with this in mind,
upheld the Act of the state and even allowed the state courts to
bring action for back payments under its law. Thus it is clear that
Congress can authorize the exercise of certain powers and as in
this case to put a burden on interstate commerce.
17
But the power of Congress is not always exclusive. South Caro-
lina imposed a tax on insurance companies engaged in interstate
commerce, and the tax for the companies engaged in interstate com-
merce was greater than the tax collected from those within the
state. The settlement of this question was made in Prudential Life
Ins. Co. v. Benjamin when the Court speaking through Justice
Rutledge said:
We are not of the opinion that what Congress intended to say
in the McCarran-Ferguson Act was that its silence or failure
to regulate the commerce business was not to be taken as mean-
ing that the business should be free from all regulation as taxa-
tion by the several states . . . . To make its meaning doubly
clear Congress provided in § 2(a) "that the business of in-
surance . . . . shall be subject to laws of the several states
15. Perkins v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 314 U. S. 586, 62 Sup. Ct.
484, 86 L. Ed. 473 (1942); Hooven and Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U. S. 652,
65 Sup. Ct. 870, 89 L. Ed. 1252 (1945).
16. 326 U. S. 310, 66 Sup. Ct 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945).
17. The court curtly stated here: "It is no longer debatable that Congress,
in the exercise of the commerce power, may authorize the states, in specified
ways, to regulate interstate commerce or impose a burden upon it." See also,
Standard Dredging Corp. v. Murphy, 319 U. S. 306, 63 Sup. Ct. 1067, 87 L. Ed.
1416 (1943) ; Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Ill. Central Railway, 299 U. S.
334, 57 Sup. Ct. 19, 81 L. Ed. 386 (1936); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,
249 U. S. 472, 39 Sup. Ct. 313, 63 L. Ed. 713 (1918) ; Hooven and Allison Co.
v. Evatt, 325 U. S. 652, 65 Sup. Ct. 870, 89 L. Ed. 1252 (1944).
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which regulate to the regulation or taxation of such business,"
that is regulation and taxation which did neither undue burden
on interstate commerce nor discriminate against the interstate
business of foreign insurance companies.' 8
Although it may be regulation of interstate commerce, South Carolina
was allowed to pass such a tax law since it provides certain ser-
vices to the company, governmental services which enables it to
perform its business. Therefore, while Congress does regulate in
some ways the insurance business, this power is not exclusive, and a
state under certain conditions can regulate.
But had Congress not acted its silence would not have meant
that there was objection to the laws of the state. The Soutlz Caro-
lina Highway Commission v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc. case is a point
along this line. Here the state was allowed to regulate a company
engaged in interstate commerce, and merely because Congress had
not acted was not evidence that Congress intended that a state's
police powers should be restricted when the safety of the people was
involved. And especially since there was no design to aid any busi-
ness within the state, the Court would uphold such a law. 19 The
problem of the upkeep of the highways and the regulation of the
traffic in the interest of safety of the people is a matter of local
concern, and it is obvious that the state could deal with such a matter
better than could the federal government. More recently a state
has been allowed to place a tax on all aircraft of a company operat-
ing in interstate commerce but who returns all planes to the home
port, which is located in the state, once each year. The Supreme
Court sustained this tax in Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota.
20
Where a matter of a peculiar local problem is involved or where
the state is sincerely interested in protecting the welfare of the
people but when it is not favoring any interest within the state, the
Court tends to uphold state regulation in the silence of Congress
on the subject.
There are two times when Congress, while acting affirmatively
in a situation involving interstate commerce, acts in such a way
that the state is precluded from passing legislation in the area,
when the state statute conflicts with some positive regulation of
the federal government or when the state enters an area which
Congress meant, according to the Court, to occupy by its legisla-
18. 328 U. S. 408, 66 Sup. Ct. 1142, 90 L. Ed. 1342 (1945). See Note, 164
A.L.R. 476.
19. Compare, Western Union Telegraph Co. v. James, 162 U. S. 650, 16 Sup.
Ct. 934, 40 L. Ed. 1105 (1896).
20. 322 U. S. 292, 64 Sup. Ct. 950, 80 L. Ed. 1283 (1944).
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tion. In three instances the Supreme Court has ruled that when,
but only when, it is clearly manifest that Congress intended to legis-
late in a particular field the state statute conflicting with the federal
statute must give way to the supremacy of the latter.2 1 There are
some instances where Congress may have begun legislation in a given
field, and it is the intention to regulate commerce in that area.
Where such an intention exists although the exact subject has not
been directly dealt with, the silence of Congress is interpreted to
mean that it is the intention to dominate the field exclusively. Also
where the state law, in terms or in practical application, conflicts
with the Act of Congress or plainly and palpably infringes on its
policy, it must bow to the supremacy of the federal Act.
22
The case of Southern Pacific Railway Co. v. Arizona is definitely
along this line. Arizona had limited the length of both passenger
and freight trains passing through the state. The court ruled that
while the power of the state to regulate the length of trains is not
superceded by § 1 of the Interstate Commerce Commission Act of
itself nor by any of the other Acts passed regarding the federal
regulation of railroads and trains, it was still invalid since it con-
travened the commerce clause of the Constitution. The Court said
that the commerce clause, even without the aid of Congressional
legislation, protects against state legislation which is inimical to the
national commerce; and in such cases, where Congress has not
acted, the Court, and not the state legislature, would be the final
arbiter of the competing demands of state and national interests.
And in this particular case the law of Arizona was considered as
being outside the realm assigned to the powers of the state by the
silence of Congress although Congress had acted only generally.
Other activities of states have had an effect on interstate com-
merce, and in the absence of any legislation by Congress the
Supreme Court has decided upon the legality of the action of the
states as well as on the intention of Congress. In regard to the
sales tax levied by the states on interstate commerce the Court has
developed two attitudes,23 (1) that interstate commerce should pay
its just share of the state tax burden and (2) that state taxes mea-
21. Reid v. State of Colorado, 187 U. S. 137, 23 Sup. Ct. 92, 47 L. Ed. 108
(1902) ; Welch Co. v. State of New Hampshire, 306 U. S. 79, 59 Sup. Ct. 438,
83 L. Ed. 500 (1939).
22. Atchinson Topeka & Santa Fe Railway v. Railroad Commissioner of the
State of California, 283 U. S. 380, 51 Sup. Ct. 553, 75 L. Ed. 1128 (1931);
Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U. S. 441, 57 Sup. Ct. 842, 81 L. Ed. 1210 (1937).
23. The sales tax was sustained in the case of Henneford v. Silas Mason Co.,
300 U. S. 577, 57 Sup. Ct. 524, 81 L. Ed. 814 (1937). See also Wiloil Corp. v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 294 U. S. 169, 55 Sup. Ct. 358, 79 L. Ed. 838
(1935).
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sured by gross receipts from interstate commerce should be sus-
tained when not involving a danger of cumulative burdens not im-
posed on local commerce. This has allowed the general sales tax
as applied to articles in interstate commerce, and it has sustained
state taxes on the sales of gasoline and oil used in interstate com-
merce. This has not been considered a restriction on interstate com-
merce.
But one of the most important areas in which Congress has re-
mained silent has been that of interstate compacts. While this is
definitely forbidden by the Constitution, without the consent of Con-
gress, (Article I, Section 10, paragraph 3), there have been a num-
ber of states that have joined hands in certain activities.
There has been a great deal of such interstate relations in New
England. The New England Council, an informal arrangement
between those states, has been instrumental in promoting and carry-
ing out a joint program for tourist attraction, parks, and recrea-
tional activities. This group has even gone so far as to work out
tax programs in regard to income, corporation, and estate taxes.
One of the great aims of this cooperation at the present time between
those states is to keep the industries which have shown a tendency
to go to other regions. In this case the Supreme Court has had
nothing to say. Actually there has been little opposition to this
program even in the press, and, since there has been a silence of
the Court as well as of Congress, we may assume that these ac-
tivities are legal at this time.
There has been one case that has come to the attention of the
Courts that provides an interesting attitude in regard to compacts
between states without the consent of Congress. Virginia and Ten-
nessee came to an agreement in regard to a decision as to where
the boundary would run between the two states. When the matter
was contested, the Supreme Court sustained the compact as both
states were in accord.2 4 It may be concluded then that when both
states are in agreement and no injury can be shown and in the
silence of Congress such interstate compacts are permitted.
Should the matter of interstate compacts be brought to the at-
tention of Congress, it will have the same difficulty in determining
the meaning "compact" as the Court has had. The problem stems
from the fact that in most instances the legislation between the
states has been reciprocal and the agreement has been a mutual
understanding. There have been definite agreements, however, and
24. State of Virginia v. State of Tennes'see, 148 U. S. 503, 13 Sup. Ct. 728,
37 L. td. 537 (1893).
9
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in disregard of the constitutional provision. Some of this has been
along economic lines designed to promote business within the states
of the compact,2 5 but mainly the purpose of these agreements have
been along the lines of law enforcement, the promotion of a par-
ticular enterprise, such as bridge building, or the settlement of a
common problem.2 6 Kansas, Wyoming, New-Mexico, and Colorado
entered into an agreement for cooperation in stopping criminal ac-
tivities in that area,27 and compacts -in regard to the pollution of
streams and the care of rivers have occurred in several instances.
2 8
As a rule these pacts have been welcomed both by the business in-
terests and by the citizens of the states, and in regard to promoting
agreements to facilitate the movement of goods among states busi-
ness interests have been very active.29 In this area of the relations
between states the silence of Congress has allowed the states to legis-
late so as to develop and promote regionalism in dealing with many
problems.
Looking only at the silence of Congress in the area of state power
to regulate commerce or to effect it either by action of its own or
by action with one or more other states allows one to see that the
subject, although narrowed somewhat, is still a broad one. In re-
gard to the action taken by a state legislature alone in regulating
or attempting to perform an act that would effect interstate com-
merce we see that the Supreme Court has interpreted the silence
of Congress in such a manner as to allow the state many powers,
and perhaps the greatest restriction is when the state favors domes-
tic interests, in its legislation, over the interests in interstate com-
merce. However, the activity of Congress in a field does not mean
that the state can not also act, but this is usually done through
permissive action by the Congress or again as long as the state is
not trying to burden interstate commerce to the advantage of its
own interests.
Where the states have acted jointly we find a large area where
the states have not had their action contested, and in the instances
25. See COSGO Machinery in Production, 10 STAnE GOVT. 229 (Nov. 1937).
26. The compacts are all listed according to the legal problem dealt with in
Interstate Compacts, 73 U. S. LAw ReV. 75, (Feb. 1939). A complete list of
the compacts will be found in THZ BooK OF T114 STAT_S, 1946-47 (Chicago,
1947).
27. See, State Cooperation for Crime Repression, 28 JOuRNAL OF CRIMINAL,
LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY, 327 (Sept. 1937). See also Interstate Compact for
Probation and Parole, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION YEARDOOK, (New York, 1938),
p. 335.
28. Ohio River Sanitation Compact, 12 STATE GoVT. 212 (Nov. 1939). Also,
State v. Federal Government in Case of Connecticut River Compact, 10 STAf
GOVT., 255 (Dec. 1937).
29. The Fight Against Interstate Barriers, 17 STAT1z GOVT. 58 (My. 1944).
10
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where such matters have come before the Courts the general dispo-
.sition has been to allow them to attempt to solve their own problems
and meet regional needs through interstate compacts. The silence
of Congress in this matter has opened a new area in the organization
of American government which as yet has not been completely de-
veloped nor its ultimate possibilities considered.
11
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